A major Turkish business group sponsoring the upcoming UN climate summit has weakened its emissions targets while its oil-refining business benefits from a global supply crunch and rising profits.

Koç Holding, one of Türkiye’s largest industrial groups, is the Global Business Partner of COP31, which will take place in Antalya from November 9 to 20, 2026. Its energy subsidiary, Tüpraş, operates the country’s largest oil-refining business.

An investigation by Climate Home News found that Koç Holding and Tüpraş lowered their 2030 emissions reduction targets in 2025. The change came as Tüpraş planned to keep its refineries running at high capacity and prepare for higher production in 2026.

The findings raise questions about the role of major fossil fuel-linked companies at climate summits. They also highlight the challenge of judging corporate climate plans when companies continue to depend on oil while investing in lower-carbon energy.

Koç Holding and Tüpraş did not respond to multiple requests for comment from Climate Home News. The UN climate secretariat and the COP31 presidency also declined to answer questions about the sponsorship agreement.

COP31 Sponsorship Raises Questions About Climate Integrity

Koç Holding was named COP31’s Global Business Partner in August 2026. The COP31 presidency said the group would share its experience in turning climate commitments into practical business action.

The partnership gives Koç a prominent role at a summit designed to advance global climate action. But the company’s oil business has brought its climate record under fresh scrutiny.

The hosting agreement between Türkiye and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) says the government should seek advice from the UN climate secretariat when assessing potential partners. The agreement also says that a partner’s “climate integrity” should be considered.

However, the process for applying this test remains unclear. The Turkish presidency has not published its sponsor-selection criteria or the financial terms of its partnership agreements.

Campaigners say companies with major fossil fuel businesses should face stronger checks before receiving prominent roles at climate conferences. They argue that sponsorship can give companies visibility and access to policymakers, even when their business plans remain tied to oil and gas.

The issue is not limited to COP31. Previous climate summits have also accepted sponsorship from companies linked to fossil fuels, prompting calls for clearer rules on corporate participation.

Koç Holding and Tüpraş Lowered Their Emissions Targets

Koç Holding and Tüpraş both announced lower interim emissions reduction targets in 2025. The companies had previously aimed to cut emissions from their own operations by 27% by 2030, compared with 2017 levels. They reduced that target to 20%.

Tüpraş also lowered its 2035 target from a 35% reduction to 25%. Both companies have retained their long-term ambition to reach carbon neutrality by 2050.

The companies said changing market conditions, economic pressures and technology developments had affected their plans. Koç Holding also pointed to the slower-than-expected development of green hydrogen, which had been an important part of its earlier transition strategy.

The revised 2030 targets are closer to the progress the companies had already made. By 2025, Koç Holding had cut emissions from its own operations by about 16% from 2017 levels, while Tüpraş had reduced them by around 17%.

This means the companies have less ground to cover to meet their updated interim goals. However, lower targets do not automatically mean emissions will rise. Actual results will depend on future operations, investments, and emissions reporting.

Oil Refining Remains Central to the Business

Tüpraş is the main source of income for Koç Holding’s energy division. It operates four refineries that turn crude oil into petrol, diesel, jet fuel, and other products.

In 2025, Tüpraş processed 28.1 million tonnes of crude oil and other materials and produced 26.8 million tonnes of products. Its refineries operated at 93% of capacity.

The company planned to raise production to 29 million tonnes in 2026. It has said it intends to maintain existing refinery capacity and run its facilities at maximum potential.

Tüpraş has also benefited from strong refining margins. These margins—the difference between the cost of crude oil and the value of refined products—rose as the global oil-processing market faced supply pressures linked to the Middle East crisis.

The strong oil business sits alongside the group’s stated climate ambitions. Koç Holding and Tüpraş have pledged to reach carbon neutrality by 2050, but oil refining is expected to remain an important source of earnings for years to come.

The issue is not simply that Tüpraş continues to operate refineries. The key question is whether its investments and emissions plans will lead to a meaningful shift away from fossil fuels over time.

• RELATED: Big Oil’s Showdown: How Shell, Chevron & ExxonMobil Balance Big Profits with Net Zero?

Most of the Group’s Emissions Come From Sold Fuels

A major gap in the revised targets is their limited coverage of the group’s overall climate impact. The targets focus on emissions from the companies’ own operations and purchased energy. These are known as Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions.

But much of the climate impact comes from products sold to customers. When petrol, diesel and jet fuel are burned in cars, trucks and aircraft, they release greenhouse gases. These emissions are known as Scope 3.

Climate Home News reported that Scope 3 emissions accounted for about 97% of Koç Holding’s carbon footprint. These emissions rose by roughly one-sixth between 2019 and 2024, and neither Koç Holding nor Tüpraş has set a target to reduce them.

This distinction matters when assessing a company’s climate progress. A refinery can cut the energy it uses and improve its own efficiency while continuing to sell large volumes of fossil fuels. Without a clear plan to address emissions from sold products, cuts at factories and refineries may cover only a small part of the company’s total climate impact.

Green Investment Plans Face Delays and Cost Pressures

Koç Holding and Tüpraş are also investing in lower-carbon energy. Their plans include renewable electricity, sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) and green hydrogen.

Tüpraş plans to invest $3.9 billion between 2025 and 2035 in refinery improvements and measures to reduce emissions from its operations. Its wider plan calls for $4.35 billion in investment in zero-carbon electricity, sustainable aviation fuel and green hydrogen by 2035.

The company also aims to expand its installed zero-carbon electricity capacity to 1.6 gigawatts by 2030 and 2.5 GW by 2035. Its renewable energy portfolio includes solar and wind projects, while additional developments remain in the pipeline.

However, some projects have been delayed or scaled back.

Tüpraş originally planned to begin producing green hydrogen in 2025. It now expects to launch a pilot project by 2030, with large-scale commercial production not expected before 2035. The company has cited higher costs for electrolyzers, which use electricity to split water into hydrogen and oxygen.

Its SAF plans have also changed. Instead of converting an existing refinery unit by 2026, Tüpraş now plans to build a separate plant expected to begin operating toward the end of 2028. That change means the new fuel production would be added to existing refining capacity rather than replacing it.

The projects could support the transition to lower-carbon energy. But delays and high costs show how difficult it can be to turn long-term climate plans into operating businesses.

COP31 Puts Corporate Climate Claims Under the Spotlight

The Koç Holding case highlights a wider challenge for COP31: how to bring businesses into climate action while ensuring their claims match their investment decisions and emissions results.

Corporate partnerships can help fund new technology and expand clean energy projects. But a sponsor’s role at a climate summit also carries reputational value, making the selection process important.

For Koç Holding and Tüpraş, the main test will be whether their planned investments lead to substantial and lasting changes in their businesses. Progress will depend on more than emissions cuts at refineries. It will also depend on how the group addresses emissions from the fuels it sells and whether its low-carbon projects move forward.

COP31’s approach to sponsor screening may also shape future debates over the role of companies with large fossil fuel interests at UN climate conferences.

As world leaders prepare to meet in Antalya, the question is not only what companies promise to do. It is whether their targets, spending, and business plans show a credible path toward lower emissions.

• READ MORE: COP31 Handbook Targets $20 Billion in Climate Finance for Vulnerable Countries

The post COP31 Sponsor Koç Holding Cuts Climate Targets as Oil Profits Rise appeared first on Carbon Credits.

Disseminated on behalf of Sierra Madre Gold & Silver Ltd.

Mexico remains the world’s largest silver-producing country, but its output declined in 2025. As global silver supply struggles to expand, the country’s mature mining districts, existing infrastructure, and pipeline of established assets could become increasingly important to the next supply cycle. Sierra Madre Gold & Silver is developing two such assets through La Guitarra and Del Toro.

Mexico occupies a unique position in the global silver market. The country produced 172.9 million ounces of silver in 2025, according to the World Silver Survey 2026, accounting for roughly one-fifth of global mine production.

However, Mexico’s dominance does not mean its silver output is continually increasing. Production fell 5% from 181.1 million ounces in 2024, even as global silver mine production increased 3% to 846.6 million ounces.

That contrast matters.

Mexico is the largest source of mined silver in the world. Yet, it’s getting harder to keep or boost production as mature mines decline and the global market faces deficits.

For the silver market, the question is therefore not simply how much silver Mexico produces today. It is whether the country can continue supplying significant volumes as existing operations mature.

Sierra Madre Gold & Silver offers a case study in one potential response. The company operates the La Guitarra complex in Temascaltepec, State of Mexico, and is advancing the restart of the Del Toro complex in Zacatecas.

Both are established mining assets with existing infrastructure and production histories.

Mexico Remains the World’s Silver Leader

Mexico has held the top position in global silver production for years. Its 2025 output of 172.9 million ounces represented approximately 20% of global mine production.

Peru ranked second, followed by China, Poland, and Bolivia, according to the Silver Institute and Metals Focus.

The scale is significant. In 2025, Mexico made more silver than many countries did in their whole mining sectors. This makes its output a key factor in the global supply.

Yet, the 5% year-over-year decline also illustrates the challenge facing mature silver jurisdictions.

Being the largest producer does not guarantee production growth.

Mining assets age. Ore grades can change. Underground development becomes more complex. Processing plants require investment. Permits and infrastructure must be maintained.

At the same time, new deposits take years to move from discovery to production. This creates a potential role for established mining districts and brownfield assets.

The Next Supply Cycle May Depend on Existing Districts

A large part of Mexico’s silver production comes from mining districts with decades or even centuries of operating history.

That creates an unusual advantage. Established districts can have roads, power systems, water infrastructure, processing facilities, underground workings, and experienced mining workforces already in place.

Those assets do not eliminate development costs or operating risks. But they can change the starting point for companies seeking to restart or expand production.

This is particularly relevant in a market where global mine supply is not responding quickly enough to close persistent deficits.

The World Silver Survey 2026 recorded a 40.3-million-ounce deficit in 2025, the fifth consecutive annual deficit. Metals Focus expects another 46.3-million-ounce deficit in 2026.

If global supply needs additional ounces, bringing established assets back online could form part of the response.

Mexico has a large inventory of those assets.

La Guitarra Sits Inside Mexico’s Historic Silver Belt

Sierra Madre’s La Guitarra complex provides one example. Located near Temascaltepec in the State of Mexico, La Guitarra is part of a historic silver-producing district.

Sierra Madre acquired the operation from First Majestic Silver and restarted commercial production on January 1, 2025. The operation already had a processing plant and established underground workings, allowing Sierra Madre to restart production without developing an entirely new mine and mill.

The company has since been expanding the operation.

The original processing configuration was approximately 500 tonnes per day. Sierra Madre is now targeting 750–800 tpd in its first expansion phase and 1,200–1,500 tpd by Q3 2027 in the second phase.

In September 2026, the company reported steady throughput of up to 720 tpd as development advanced at the Guitarra and Nazareno mines. This progression shows how an established Mexican asset can become a source of incremental supply.

Instead of starting with a discovery and building an entirely new mine, Sierra Madre started with a past-producing operation and is investing to increase its capacity.

Del Toro Adds a Second Mexican District

Sierra Madre’s Mexican strategy extends beyond La Guitarra. In June 2026, the company completed the acquisition of the Del Toro Silver Mine in Zacatecas from First Majestic. 

Zacatecas is one of Mexico’s most important historic silver-producing regions and has been a major contributor to the country’s position in global silver mining.

Del Toro itself operated from 2013 through 2019 under First Majestic. The property includes three underground mines, San Juan, Perseverancia and Dolores, together with more than 62.5 kilometers of existing underground development.

The complex also contains a 3,000-tonnes-per-day flotation facility, as well as other processing and infrastructure assets. This infrastructure provides Sierra Madre with a solid base to assess future production.

The company plans to restart Del Toro at approximately 800 tpd, with potential to increase throughput to 1,600 tpd.

Sierra Madre currently targets the restart process for mid-2027 and first production for mid-2028. These are company targets and depend on the completion of technical, development and operational work.

Zacatecas Shows Why Existing Infrastructure Matters

Del Toro’s history also demonstrates the depth of Mexico’s established mining infrastructure.

First Majestic invested approximately US$175 million to develop the operation, according to Sierra Madre’s acquisition materials. The mine subsequently produced an average of approximately 2.54 million silver-equivalent ounces per year between 2015 and 2018.

Sierra Madre is not simply attempting to restart historical production at the same scale.

The company is doing more exploration and resource work. They are also looking at the best way to restart operations.

The property has a large exploration database and Sierra Madre found several mineralized zones for further study. That gives the asset two potential roles.

• First, it can provide a platform for restarting production.
• Second, exploration could potentially extend the mine’s future resource base.

Any future resource estimate, however, will need to be established through updated technical work. Historical estimates and past production figures should not be treated as current mineral resources or guarantees of future production.

Mexico’s Importance Goes Beyond Two Mines

Sierra Madre’s assets are only two examples within a much larger Mexican mining industry.

The country has extensive experience in underground mining, processing and silver production. It also has established mining districts, transportation networks, power infrastructure, and skilled labor.

That ecosystem matters when the global silver market needs additional production.

New greenfield mines will remain necessary over the long term, but the timeline from discovery to commercial production can be lengthy.

Brownfield expansions and restarts can potentially provide another route. The distinction is becoming more important because silver supply remains structurally constrained.

About three-quarters of silver produced worldwide comes from other metals. This means that higher silver prices can’t quickly boost primary silver production.

Mexico’s established silver assets therefore represent more than historical production. They form part of the existing physical infrastructure that can potentially be expanded, modernized or restarted.

A Mature Producer Still Has Room to Grow

Mexico’s 5% production decline in 2025 is a reminder that being the world’s largest silver producer does not make supply growth automatic. The country needs continued investment to maintain production from existing mines while developing the next generation of deposits. 

That creates a balancing act.

Existing operations need additional exploration and capital to replace depleted reserves and maintain output. At the same time, past-producing assets can offer opportunities to add production without starting from an undeveloped site.

Sierra Madre’s strategy reflects both sides.

• At La Guitarra, the company is expanding a restarted operation and increasing processing capacity.
• Del Toro is considering restarting a former production site. They are also doing more exploration and technical work.

The two assets are at different stages. However, both show how established Mexican mining infrastructure is being revived or expanded.

The Next Mexican Silver Ounces May Already Have Infrastructure Behind Them

Mexico’s position in the silver market is unlikely to depend on a single new discovery. The country’s importance comes from the depth of its mining industry and the scale of its existing production base.

Its 172.9 million ounces of silver production in 2025 demonstrate the country’s enormous contribution to global supply. But the 5% decline from 2024 also shows why maintaining that position will require continued investment.

That is where established assets can become relevant.

La Guitarra is already producing and being expanded. Del Toro has a production history, extensive underground development, and a substantial processing facility.

Neither project guarantees future production, and both require continued capital and execution. But they illustrate a broader point about the next silver supply cycle.

When global mine production is struggling to grow, the industry’s response may not come only from newly discovered deposits.

Some of the next ounces could come from old mining districts, existing mills, past-producing mines, and brownfield expansions.

Mexico has more of that infrastructure than almost any other silver-producing country. And as the global silver market searches for additional supply, that existing foundation could make the country an important part of the next production cycle.

• READ MORE: Silver Falls 45% From Its 2026 Peak as Sierra Madre Scales Up Production

DISCLAIMER
New Era Publishing Inc. and/or CarbonCredits.com (“We” or “Us”) are not securities dealers or brokers, investment advisers, or financial advisers, and you should not rely on the information herein as investment advice. Sierra Madre Gold and Silver Ltd. (“Company”) made a one-time payment of $25,000 to provide marketing services for a term of one month. None of the owners, members, directors, or employees of New Era Publishing Inc. and/or CarbonCredits.com currently hold, or have any beneficial ownership in, any shares, stocks, or options of the companies mentioned.

This article is informational only and is solely for use by prospective investors in determining whether to seek additional information. It does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any securities. Examples that we provide of share price increases pertaining to a particular issuer from one referenced date to another represent arbitrarily chosen time periods and are no indication whatsoever of future stock prices for that issuer and are of no predictive value.

Our stock profiles are intended to highlight certain companies for your further investigation; they are not stock recommendations or an offer or sale of the referenced securities. The securities issued by the companies we profile should be considered high-risk; if you do invest despite these warnings, you may lose your entire investment. Please do your own research before investing, including reviewing the companies’ SEDAR+ and SEC filings, press releases, and risk disclosures.

It is our policy that information contained in this profile was provided by the company, extracted from SEDAR+ and SEC filings, company websites, and other publicly available sources. We believe the sources and information are accurate and reliable, but we cannot guarantee them.

CAUTIONARY STATEMENT AND FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION

Certain statements contained in this news release may constitute “forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable securities laws. Forward-looking information generally can be identified by words such as “anticipate,” “expect,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “plan,” and similar expressions suggesting future outcomes or events. Forward-looking information is based on current expectations of management; however, it is subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties, and other factors that may cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated.

These factors include, without limitation, statements relating to the Company’s exploration and development plans, the potential of its mineral projects, financing activities, regulatory approvals, market conditions, and future objectives. Forward-looking information involves numerous risks and uncertainties and actual results might differ materially from results suggested in any forward-looking information. These risks and uncertainties include, among other things, market volatility, the state of financial markets for the Company’s securities, fluctuations in commodity prices, operational challenges, and changes in business plans.

Forward-looking information is based on several key expectations and assumptions, including, without limitation, that the Company will continue with its stated business objectives and will be able to raise additional capital as required. Although management of the Company has attempted to identify important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially, there may be other factors that cause results not to be as anticipated, estimated, or intended.

There can be no assurance that such forward-looking information will prove to be accurate, as actual results and future events could differ materially. Accordingly, readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking information. Additional information about risks and uncertainties is contained in the Company’s management’s discussion and analysis and annual information form for the year ended December 31, 2025, copies of which are available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.

The forward-looking information contained herein is expressly qualified in its entirety by this cautionary statement. Forward-looking information reflects management’s current beliefs and is based on information currently available to the Company. The forward-looking information is made as of the date of this news release, and the Company assumes no obligation to update or revise such information to reflect new events or circumstances except as may be required by applicable law.

For more information on the Company, investors should review the Company’s continuous disclosure filings available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.

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The post Mexico Produces One-Fifth of the World’s Silver: Why the Country Still Matters to the Next Supply Cycle appeared first on Carbon Credits.

The cost of producing a carbon credit varies widely by project type, financing needs, and operating conditions. A new report from carbon credit ratings provider Sylvera, developed in collaboration with the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM), examines these costs across different carbon project categories.

The report draws on 53 responses from project developers working across afforestation, reforestation and revegetation (ARR), biochar, REDD+, cookstoves, regenerative agriculture and mangroves. It examines capital expenditure, operating costs, financing assumptions, additional revenue streams and community benefit-sharing.

The findings show that producing high-integrity credits can require very different levels of investment. They also highlight how financing costs and limited transparency can affect project economics, particularly for nature-based solutions and community-led projects.

Biochar Has the Highest Carbon Credit Production Costs

The report found a significant gap in the median cost of delivering a carbon credit across the project types with sufficient data for detailed analysis.

Biochar had the highest median levelized cost at $185 per credit, followed by ARR at $36. Cookstove projects recorded a median of $21, while REDD+ projects had the lowest median at $6.

These differences reflect how each project operates. Biochar projects often require specialized equipment, processing facilities, and significant upfront investment. Their economics can also depend on access to suitable biomass, reliable operations, and demand for the biochar product.

ARR projects face a different challenge. Developers must invest in land preparation, planting, and project establishment before forests generate substantial volumes of credits. REDD+ projects, by contrast, focus on protecting existing forests, making their cost structure less dependent on establishing new tree cover.

However, the figures are benchmarks rather than universal production costs. The report’s sample is limited, and the $6 REDD+ median should be treated as directional rather than a definitive industry-wide estimate.

• CHECK: LIVE CARBON PRICES

Upfront Investment and Operating Costs Shape Project Economics

Carbon credit production costs depend on both the money developers spend to establish projects and the expenses they incur to keep them running. Capital expenditure (CapEx) includes early investments, while operating expenditure (OpEx) covers activities such as monitoring, verification, and project management.

• ARR stands out because 71% of its median levelized cost comes from upfront investment. Developers must finance land preparation and planting before they can generate meaningful credit volumes.
• Biochar, REDD+, and cookstove projects have a lower median CapEx share, leaving a greater proportion of their costs associated with ongoing operations.

This difference also affects how projects respond to financing conditions. Developers that need substantial upfront capital face greater exposure to interest rates, investor return expectations, and country-specific risks.

Higher Financing Costs Can Make Carbon Credits More Expensive

Sylvera tested how changing the assumed cost of capital affects the levelized cost of credits. Its central scenario uses a 10% discount rate, with alternative scenarios at 5% and 15%.

ARR costs rise by nearly 37% when the assumed discount rate increases from 10% to 15%. The increase is much smaller for the other project types.

The report links this difference to ARR’s capital-intensive structure and longer investment horizon. Higher financing costs can make projects less attractive to investors and limit the amount of capital available for development.

Community-led and Indigenous-led projects may face additional barriers because they often operate in markets with higher perceived risks and have less access to institutional finance. Blended finance, concessional loans and investment guarantees could help reduce these barriers, although access remains uneven.

• ALSO READ: Carbon Credits Get More Expensive as Q3 Retirements Decline, Sylvera Finds

Project Scale Can Reduce Costs, but Other Factors Matter

The report also identifies a relationship between project size and production costs. Across biochar, ARR, REDD+, and cookstove projects, higher annual credit volumes generally correspond to lower costs per credit.

For biochar, the highest-cost project in the sample produces fewer than 500 credits annually and has a levelized cost of about $544 per credit. Lower-cost projects, with costs ranging from approximately $25 to $140 per credit, cluster around annual volumes of 2,300 credits or more.

Larger operations may spread equipment, staffing, and other fixed expenses across more credits. However, scale alone does not determine costs. Technology, location, access to feedstock, and local market conditions also influence project economics. Sylvera cautions that its limited sample cannot establish a statistically reliable relationship between project size and unit costs.

Community Benefit-Sharing Needs Greater Transparency

Carbon projects can support local communities through direct payments, employment, infrastructure, training, and other services. However, Sylvera found that reported benefit-sharing arrangements vary widely, partly because developers use different definitions and reporting methods.

The reported range does not necessarily show how much cash communities receive. Some projects count direct payments, while others include employment, infrastructure, or in-kind support. This makes it difficult for buyers to compare projects or determine whether communities receive a fair share of the economic benefits.

The report recommends clearer disclosure of benefit-sharing arrangements, including the type of benefit, its recipient, payment schedule, and governance. It also proposes considering a minimum direct monetary benefit share of 30% to 35% of gross carbon revenue for projects on community-titled land. This is a recommendation for future standards, not an existing universal requirement.

Conclusion

Sylvera and ICVCM’s findings show why carbon credit buyers need more than a quoted price to assess a project. Production costs vary with technology, financing, scale, and community commitments. Better cost disclosure could help buyers compare projects, developers justify prices, and investors identify financing gaps.

Standardized reporting on community benefits would also improve accountability and help direct funding toward credible, high-integrity carbon projects.

• RECENT: UN Tightens Cookstove Carbon Credits With New Forest-Loss Reserve

The post Carbon Credit Economics: The Real Cost of Delivering High-Integrity Credits appeared first on Carbon Credits.

The world may need the equivalent of 134 new lithium mines by 2050 to meet rising demand for electric vehicles (EVs) and battery storage. The projects could require more than $100 billion in investment, before counting the contribution of recycled lithium, according to Benchmark Mineral Intelligence.

The forecast highlights a major challenge for the energy transition. Lithium demand is expected to grow sharply over the next 24 years, but mining companies must secure funding, permits and buyers before they can bring new projects into production.

Benchmark’s base-case forecast puts global lithium demand at about 7 million tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) in 2050, up from 2.11 million tonnes in 2026. However, the amount of new mining needed will depend on future demand, recycling rates, technology, and how quickly projects can be developed.

Lithium Demand Could More Than Triple by 2050

Benchmark expects global lithium demand to increase by about 4.8 million tonnes of LCE between 2026 and 2050. At an average output of 36,000 tonnes of LCE per mine each year, that growth would equal the production of 134 new mines.

In practical terms, the industry would need to bring a mine of that average size online roughly every two months for the next 24 years. Demand growth between 2040 and 2050 alone would require the equivalent of 44 additional mines.

Electric vehicles are expected to drive most of this growth. Benchmark forecasts that EVs will account for 76% of lithium demand in 2050, compared with 55% today.

Battery storage will also contribute as power grids add more renewable energy. Lithium-ion batteries help store electricity from solar and wind projects and supply it when generation falls or demand rises.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) reported that lithium demand rose by 25% in 2025, driven by electric vehicles (EVs), stationary battery storage, and clean energy technologies. These forecasts do not guarantee a particular level of demand. EV sales, government policies, battery technology and economic conditions will all affect how much lithium the market needs.

More Than $100 Billion Must Flow Into New Mines

Meeting the base-case demand forecast will require more than $100 billion in investment for new lithium mining capacity, Benchmark estimates. Its higher-demand scenario raises the challenge further:

• Demand could approach 9 million tonnes of LCE by 2050, requiring the equivalent of around 180 mines and well over $150 billion.

The figures show why securing capital is as important as finding lithium deposits. A mineral resource does not become a producing mine overnight. Developers must complete studies, arrange financing, obtain permits, build processing facilities and connect projects to transport and power infrastructure.

Projects can also face delays from technical problems, environmental reviews and community concerns. These risks can increase costs and push production further into the future.

Benchmark lithium product director Cameron Perks identified another hurdle: keeping investors committed when lithium prices fall. He stated:

“Meeting 2050 demand requires the equivalent of 134 new lithium mines, more than US$100 billion of investment before any contribution from recycling, rising to more than 180 mines in our upside scenario. The biggest challenge is sustaining that investment through price cycles, while competing for capital with AI, defence and the wider energy transition.”

The investment estimate is a forecast, not a record of money already committed. It also depends on Benchmark’s assumptions about average mine size, demand, and future supply. Actual spending could vary by project and region.

Lithium Prices Show Why Funding Can Be Difficult

The lithium market has already experienced sharp price swings. Benchmark data cited by Investing News Network show that battery-grade lithium carbonate ended the third quarter of 2026 at $19,025 per tonne, down 20.8% from the previous quarter. Spodumene concentrate, a key hard-rock lithium feedstock, fell 23.5% over the same period to $1,780 per tonne.

Lower prices can benefit battery makers and other buyers by reducing raw-material costs. However, they can also make it harder for mining companies to finance new projects, particularly those with high construction costs or more complex deposits.

This creates a difficult cycle. When prices rise, companies have a stronger incentive to expand supply. If many projects enter production around the same time, extra supply can then push prices down. When prices fall, developers may delay or cancel projects, potentially limiting future supply.

The IEA notes a big change in critical minerals. Market ups and downs have led to less capital spending. Following a sharp slowdown in previous years, global investment in critical mineral development declined by 9% in 2025, ending several consecutive years of growth.

The pullback was particularly severe for battery materials, where investment dropped by 20%. Mineral prices hit rock bottom for years. Then, they rebounded in late 2025 and early 2026. This change happened as supply tightened and export controls increased.

A market that appears well supplied today can therefore face a different outlook later. New mines take years to develop, so investment decisions must account for demand well beyond the current price cycle.

• INTERESTING READ: Lithium Prices Up 92% Year Over Year as PLS Group Posts A$526M Profit

Australia, China and North America Face Shifting Supply Roles

The location of new mines will shape the future lithium supply chain. Benchmark forecasts that Australia will remain a major producer, but its share of mined lithium could fall from 29% in 2026 to 20% by 2050.

China’s share of mined supply is expected to remain around 25%, according to the forecast. Its position is stronger in processing, where Benchmark estimates that China controls roughly 70% of refined lithium production.

North America could gain a larger role. Benchmark projects that its share of mined lithium will rise from 1.7% in 2026 to 13% by 2050 as the region seeks to meet more of its own demand and reduce reliance on imported materials.

Europe faces a different gap. The region currently produces less than 1% of mined lithium while accounting for 7% of demand from battery-cell production. By 2050, Benchmark expects Europe to supply 5.5% of mined lithium against 8% of cell-production demand.

These projections depend on projects moving forward. New mines in North America and Europe may help diversify supply, but some face higher costs, permitting delays, and environmental or community concerns.

More geographically diverse supply could reduce dependence on a small number of producers. However, building mines and processing facilities in new regions will require long-term funding and reliable demand from battery manufacturers.

Battery Recycling Could Ease Pressure on New Lithium Mines

Mining is not the only way to meet future lithium demand. Recycling used batteries can return lithium to the supply chain and reduce the need for newly mined material.

Benchmark expects recycled material to account for almost half of lithium supply by 2050. Its separate capital-spending analysis estimates that meeting 2040 demand would require around $64 billion in investment, assuming recycling supplies a significant share of future needs.

However, recycling cannot replace new mines immediately. Large volumes of EV batteries must reach the end of their useful lives before recyclers can recover their materials. Collection systems, processing capacity and the cost of recovered lithium will also affect how much material returns to the market.

Battery technology could change the outlook, too. Different battery chemistries use different amounts of lithium and other minerals. Advances in battery design, improved efficiency and changes in EV demand could alter the amount of lithium required for each unit of storage.

For now, Benchmark’s estimates suggest that recycling will help meet future demand but will not remove the need for substantial new mining capacity. If recycled supply falls short of expectations, the industry may need more mines than its base case assumes.

Lithium’s Long-Term Outlook Depends on Investment Today

Benchmark’s forecast puts a clear figure on the scale of the task: 134 mines and more than $100 billion in investment under its base case. Yet, the central issue is not simply whether enough lithium exists in the ground. It is whether the industry can finance, approve and build the projects needed to bring that supply to market.

The IEA’s analysis reinforces the importance of investment, supply chain diversification and recycling across critical minerals. But forecasts remain sensitive to prices, policy decisions, technology and project delays.

For the lithium industry, the next 24 years will require a steady flow of capital through both strong and weak market conditions. Recycling can ease pressure on new supply, while new mining projects will remain important to meeting demand.

The outcome will shape more than the fortunes of mining companies. Lithium is a key material for EV batteries and energy storage, which support the shift toward lower-emission transport and electricity systems. Whether the industry can build enough supply at the right time will be an important factor in how smoothly that transition progresses.

• READ MORE: Lithium Demand to Hit 4.8 Million Tonnes by 2050, BNEF Forecasts

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